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NEW YORK'S DEATH PENALTY: THE AGE
REQUIREMENT
SALVATORE J. MODICA*
In People v. Davis, the New York Court of Appeals declared the death penalty unconstitutional. 1 However, a 1995
amendment to section 125.27 of the New York Penal Law has
reinstated death as a possible punishment. 2 In order for the
state to impose the death penalty, section 125.27 requires that
the defendant be "more than 18 years old" at the time of the
homicide.
This article will examine what the legislature intended by
the language "more than eighteen years old." Further, this article will analyze the history of the age requirement, the plain
meaning of the age requirement in the present capital murder
statute, relevant case law from New York and other jurisdictions, the general construction law, and the legislative intent
underlying the current statute and other New York statutes with
similar language. This analysis will illustrate that the death
penalty does indeed apply to persons as of the date of their
eighteenth birthday.
I. HISTORY OF THE AGE REQUIREMENT IN DEATH PENALTY
JURISPRUDENCE

Prior to 1948, "a child over seven and under sixteen could
be prosecuted for murder or any other crime punishable by death
* The author, currently the Principal Law Clerk to Judge William C. Donnino, sitting
in Criminal Term, Supreme Court, Bronx County, would like to thank Judges Deborah
Stevens Modica and William C. Donnino for their editorial suggestions. The views expressed in this article, however, are solely those of the author.
1 43 N.Y. 2d 17 (1977). See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27 (McKinney 1998) (discussing
failure of section 125.27 to meet constitutional muster in 1994).
2 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27 (McKinney 1998) (noting Governor's approval memorandum argues that imposition of death penalty acts as deterrent, and provides justice
for those impacted by violent criminals); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 60.06 (McKinney 1998).
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or life imprisonment."3 In 1948, Governor Dewey, horrified at
the prospect that a seven year old child could be tried and put to
death in New York, signed legislation specifically designed to increase the age for capital punishment. As a result of this legislation, only those individuals fifteen years of age and older could
potentially be sentenced to death upon a conviction of Murder in
'4
the First Degree "or any other crime punishable by death.
By 1963, in a bill prepared by the Temporary State Commission on Revision of the Penal Law and Criminal Code (the
"Commission"), the Legislature excluded persons "under eighteen years of age" from the reach of the death penalty. 5 Since that
legislation did not expressly make the age requirement an element of murder in the first degree, 6 a person under eighteen
years of age could be tried for that crime, but the only possible
7
sentence was life imprisonment.
In 1965, with the enactment of the Revised Penal Law, the
former Penal Law statutes8 were repealed and replaced. 9 The
new statute, scheduled to take effect September 1, 1967, provided that upon conviction for the crime of murder, a defendant
must be held over for a death sentence hearing unless the court
was "satisfied that [the defendant] was less than eighteen years
old at the time of the commission of the crime, or that the sentence
of death [was] not warranted because of substantial mitigating
1 0 If either of these two factors existed, punishcircumstances".
3 People v. Oliver, 1 N.Y.2d 152, 155 (1956). See FORMER N.Y. PENAL LAW § 486 (L.
1924 c. 477); FORMER N.Y. PENAL LAW § 2186 (L. 1909 c. 478); see also People v. Murch,
263 N.Y.258, 285 (1934) (highlighting criminal court's jurisdiction over children less than
16 years of age); Michael Lumer & Nancy Tenney, The Death Penalty in N.Y.: An Historical Perspective, 4 J.L. & POL'Y 81, 92 (discussing N.Y. legislation on Death Penalty
from 1963-77).
4 See Oliver, 1 N.Y.2d at 155-57; see also FORMER N.Y. PENAL LAW § 2186 (L. 1949 c.
388); FORMER N.Y. PENAL LAW § 486 (L. 1948 c. 554).
5 See FORMER N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1045 (L. 1963 c. 994); FORMER N.Y. PENAL LAW §
1045 (McKinney 1987) (discussing 1963 amendment to § 1045); see also James R. Acker,
New York's ProposedDeath Penalty Legislation: Constitutional& Policy Perspectives, 54
ALB. L. REV. 515, 523 (1990) (discussing significant changes made with 1963 legislation).
6 See FORMER N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1044 (L. 1909 c. 88).
7 See FORMER N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1045(3) (L. 1963 c. 994) (adding subdivision four to
Former N.Y. Penal Law section 1045 and transferring the language relating to persons
under 18 years of age into that fourth subsection); see also James R. Acker, When the
Cheering Stopped: An Overview & Analysis of New York's Death Penalty Legislation, 17
PACE L. REV. 41, 49 (1996) (stating that New York law has exempted offenders who are
not over 18 from death-penalty eligibility since 1963).
8 Former N.Y. Penal Law §§ 1045, 1045-a (L. 1963 c. 994).
9 Former N.Y. Penal Law §§ 125.30, 125.35 (L. 1965 c. 1030).
10 Former N.Y. Penal Law § 125.30 (L. 1965 c. 1030).
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ment by death was not authorized. Instead, the Court was required to impose a life sentence. This version of the death penalty never became effective because prior to September 1, 1967
the statute was again amended by the Legislature. 11 One of the
amendments directed the court to conduct a death penalty proceeding before a jury, following a conviction of Murder, "if [the
court was] satisfied" that a defendant "was more than eighteen
12
years old at the time of the commission of the crime."
In 1974, following the Court of Appeal's decision in People
v. Fitzpatrick,13 New York's 1967 death penalty statute was repealed,14 and the new crime of Murder in the First Degree was
created.15 Upon conviction for this crime, the death penalty was
mandatory.16 In language identical to that of the former Revised
Penal Law, 17 the legislature limited the death penalty to defendants who were "more than eighteen years old at the time of the
commission of the crime." 18 Unlike the former law, which required the court to make the age determination, the 1974 legislation made the "more than eighteen" language an element of the
11 Law of 1967, c. 791 § 10, 1967 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.30 (repealed 1974); Law of
1967, c. 1031 § 1, 1967 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.35 (repealed 1974).
12 Former N.Y. Penal Law § 125.30(1)(b) (repealed 1974).
13 32 N.Y.2d 499 (1973).
14 FORMER N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 125.30, 125.35 (repealed 1974); see also Acker, supra
note 5, at 524-29 (stating that N.Y. Court of Appeals applied Supreme Court's holding in
Furman v. Georgia which found N.Y.'s death penalty procedures unconstitutional).
15 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27 (L. 1974 c. 367). The 1974 amendment brought back
the crimes of Murder in the First and Second Degree, though they differed in substance
from the Former Penal Law. Id.; see also FORMER N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 1044, 1046 (L. 1909
c. 88). Under the Former Penal Law, there were two degrees of murder - Murder in the
First and Second Degree. Id.; FORMER N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25 (L. 1965 c. 1030). The
Revised Penal Law, however, did not provide for graduations of murder. Id.; But see
Acker, supra note 5, at 527. New York's 1967 legislation followed the format of the Model
Penal Code, eliminating the distinction between First and Second degree murder. Id.
16 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 60.06 (McKinney 1977); FORMER N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1045 (L.
1909 c. 88). Prior to 1937, the death penalty was mandatory in New York upon a conviction for Murder in the First Degree. Id.; see also Law of 1937, c. 67 §§ 1,2. Effective
March 17, 1937, the death penalty was no longer mandatory for "felony murders or in
non-premeditated but wanton killings." Id. A jury could recommend life imprisonment,
albeit such recommendation was not binding on the sentencing court. Id.; Governor
Rockefeller's Approval Mem., 1963 McKinney's Session Law at 2076-77. The 1963 legislation did away with the mandatory death penalty for premeditated murder and gave the
jury the discretion to impose or not impose the death penalty, a decision which the sentencing court could not set aside. Id.
17 Former N.Y. Penal Law § 125.30 (repealed 1974).
18 See FORMER N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1045 (L. 1963 c. 994)."Supreme Court made it clear
that a mandatory death sentence was not constitutional, and that a sentencing scheme
that authorized the jury to exercise discretion within structured statutory guidelines,
taking into consideration both aggravating and mitigating factors was constitutional." Id.
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definition of Murder in the First Degree. Therefore, it became
the jury's responsibility to determine whether the evidence established, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant was
"more than eighteen years old" at the time the homicide was
committed. In 1995, after the statute was again amended, the
age requirement was retained in the same language as the 1967
and 1974 drafts, and continued to be an element of Murder in
the First Degree. 19

II. PLAIN MEANING

OF THE AGE REQUIREMENT LANGUAGE

When the phrase "more than eighteen years old," was first
inserted into the death penalty statute in 1967, neither the governor nor the legislature attempted to explain its meaning, nor
did either branch provide any clarification in the 1974 or 1995
amendments. 2 0 The plain meaning of Former Penal Law section
1045,21 as well as case law, support the conclusion that the language, "less than eighteen year old", as used in that statute,
meant persons who, at the time of the commission of the crime,
had not reached their eighteenth birthday. 2 2 Thus, under the
death penalty law prior to the September 1, 1967 change, persons who were at least eighteen years old at the time they com23
mitted a murder were subject to the death penalty.
However, the plain meaning of the term, "more than eighteen years old," in section 125.27 of the penal law, is not easily
discernible. This term may apply only to persons who have attained their nineteenth birthday, since the "more than" language
19 See Acker, supra note 7, at 49. (stating "To be convicted of 1st degree murder, and
thus be eligible for the death penalty, an offender must have been more than 18 years old
at the time of the commission of the crime."); see also William Hauptman, Note, Lethal
Reflection: New York's New Death Penalty and Victim Impact Statements 13 N.Y.L. SCH.
J. HUM. RTS. 439, 452 (1997) (stating that currently there is little dispute as to constitutionality of new law). See generally, Acker, supra note 5, at 534-36 (discussing legislative
intent for expanded death penalty statutes from 1977 to 1990).
20 See People v. Carr, 159 Misc.2d 1093, 1094 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994) (stating that court
found no published legislative history on meaning of phrase "more than eighteen years
old" as used in statute).
21 Former N.Y. Penal Law (L. 1963 c. 994) (amended L. 1965 c. 321).
22 See People v. Stevenson, 23 A.D.2d 472, 473 (2d Dep't 1965), rev'd 17 N.Y.2d 682
(1966) (holding defendant who was born on August 25, 1947 was on August 24, 1963, less
than sixteen years old to be within meaning of Family Court Act Section 712(a)).
23 The 1963 version of Former N.Y. Penal Law § 1045 expressed the age requirement
as "under eighteen years of age." It is obvious that the expressions "less than eighteen
years old" and "under eighteen years of age" have the same meaning.
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24
arguably excludes persons eighteen years of age or younger.
Alternatively, the age of a person can be subdivided. A person
born at the stroke of midnight on January 1, 1980, would have
lived in excess of eighteen years one second after midnight on
January 1, 1998, and, at that point in time, would be "more than
eighteen years old." 25 Still another possible interpretation of this
phrase is that it excludes persons who are alleged to have committed murder on their eighteenth birthday and, instead, applies
only to persons eighteen years and one day old or older. 2 6 In
sum, the term, "more than eighteen years old," does not necessarily mean nineteen years or older. Logically, the phrase may
apply to persons who commit murder either on their eighteenth
birthday or in their eighteenth year. 2 7 The various interpretations of this language demonstrate that there is no plain meaning to the term "more than eighteen years old." 2 8 Accordingly,
the legislative intent cannot be discerned merely by looking at
the language.

III. OTHER JURISDICTIONS
Courts in other jurisdictions, that have interpreted age requirements in similarly worded statutes, have reached different
conclusions. For example, in State v. Hansen,2 9 the Supreme
Court of Florida held that the phrase, "over eleven years old,"
24 See Acker, supra note 7, at 49 (discussing ambiguities created by language of statute); see also Carr, 159 Misc.2d at 1093 (holding that "the phrase more than eighteen
years old includes persons who have reached their eighteenth birthday").
25 Of course, strictly applying this analysis, if the homicide is committed by persons
on their eighteenth birthday, but prior to the exact time of their birth, those persons
would not, under this view, be "more than eighteen years old."
26 See Matter of Ellingham, 116 A.D.2d 1032, 1033 (4th Dep't 1986). It should be
noted that, "in determining a person's age, fractions of days are not computed." Id. In Ellingham, the Appellate Division held that the "defendant became 16 years of age at the
beginning of the day of his 16th birthday." That the defendant had been born in the afternoon was irrelevant in determining his age. Id.; see also Aultman Taylor Co. v. Syme,
163 NY 54, 61 (1900). "The law does not recognize fractions of days." Id.
27 See N.Y. CONSTR. & INTERP. LAW § 94 (McKinney 1997) (indicating legislative intent is to be ascertained from words and language used, and statutory language is generally construed according to its natural and most obvious sense, without resorting to artificial or forced construction); N.Y. CONSTR. & INTERP. LAW § 232 (McKinney 1997)
(stating words of ordinary import used in statutes are to be given their usual and commonly understood meaning, unless it is plain from statute that different meaning is intended).
28 See Acker, supra note 7, at 49 (stating that meaning of "more than eighteen years
old at time of commission of crime will not be certain until New York Court of Appeals
has opportunity to decide minimum age for 1st degree murder liability under statute).
29 404 So.2d 199, 200 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981), affd, 421 So.2d 504 (Fla. 1982).
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applied only to children at least twelve years of age. By contrast,
a significant number of jurisdictions have taken the position that
age requirements in statutes with "more than" or "over" language do not necessarily mean the year following the particular
age mentioned. 30 But, even within the majority view, there appears to be disagreement over whether a person is "more than"
or "over" a certain age on the exact date of his birthday or on the
31
following day.
Perhaps the confusion in the meaning of the term, "more
than [x] years of age," can be traced back to the common law rule
that "a person reached his next year of age on the day before the
anniversary of his birth." 32 The rationale supporting this proposition is that "[a] person is in existence on the day of his birth.
33
On the first anniversary he has lived one year and one day."
On the day before the person's birthday, that person is exactly
one year old and the following day, the anniversary of his birth,
that person is now "over one year old." Drafters, especially those
in states that followed the common law rule (as New York did
until the Court of Appeals decided People v. Stevenson in 1966)34
30 See Bay Trust Co. v. Agricultural Life Ins. Co., 279 Mich. 248 (1937). See, e.g.,
State v. Linn, 363 P.2d 361, 363 (Alaska 1961); Arkansas v. Banks, 271 Ark. 331 (1980);
Gibson v. People, 44 Colo. 600 (1909); Farrow v. State, 258 A.2d 276, 277 (Del. 1969);
Knott v. Rawlings, 96 N.W.2d 900 (Iowa 1959); Carolina Freight Carriers Corp. v. Keane,
534 A.2d 1337 (Md. 1988); State v. McGaha, 295 S.E.2d 449 (N.C. 1982); Green v. Patriotic Sons of Am., 87 S.E.2d 14 (N.C. 1955); Ohio v. Maxon, 375 N.E.2d 781 (Ohio 1978);
In Re John Smith, 351 P.2d 1076 (Okla. Crim. App. 1960). The Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals held that where reference is made in the penal statutes to a "male over
18 years of age," it does not mean 19 years of age. Id.; State v. Jordan, 528 A.2d 731 (R.I.
1987); Butler v. State, 194 S.W. 166, 167 (Tex. Crim. App. 1917).
31 Compare Linn, 363 P.2d at 363 (stating, "We find the law to be quite well established that, with respect to penal statutes, a person is over and under a certain age, say
16 years, when he has reached that particular anniversary of his birthday."), and In Re
John Smith, 351 P.2d at 1077 (holding that when one reaches his fiftieth birthday, he
will not have lived fifty calendar years), with McGaha, 306 N.C. at 700 (asserting that
once child has reached twelfth birthday, child is no longer twelve years old or less);
Maxon, 54 Ohio St.2d at 191 (ruling that person past fifteenth birthday is "over fifteen
years of age"), and Gibson, 99 P. at 333 (noting some states hold that people who are, for
example, eighteen years and one day old, are no longer "eighteen and under").
32 Ellingham, 116 A.D.2d at 1033 (4th Dep't 1986) (stating that person reached his
next year of age at first moment of day before anniversary of his birth (citing Nichols v.
Ramsel, 2 Mod. 280, 86 Eng. Rep. 1072 (1677))); see Fisher v. Smith, 319 F. Supp. 855,
856 (W.D. Wash. 1970) (explaining that person's given age is computed by earliest moment of day proceeding anniversary of birth).
33 See In re Harris, 5 Cal. App. 4th 813, 844 (1993) (quoting State v. Alley, 594
S.W.2d 381, 382 (Tenn. 1980)); see also Bailey v. City of Lawrence, Indiana, 972 F.2d
1447, 1458 (7th Cir. 1992) (recognizing "of age" requirement met on day proceeding traditional birthday); In re Rosenstein's Estate, 124 N.Y.S.2d 783, 786 (Sur. Ct. 1953) (stating
that the calendar year means period of 365 days from January 1 through December 31).
34 See People v. Stevenson 23 A.D.2d 472, 473 rev'd 17 N.Y.2d 682 (1966); see also
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may have wanted to exclude persons whose birthday would be
computed by this legal fiction. Perhaps a much simpler explanation exists to figure out these ambiguous phrases; the terms
Clover [x] years old" and "more than [x] years old" have come to
include the particular age mentioned based upon "long standing
custom and usage." 3 5 Regardless of the accuracy of these explanations, the majority rule fails to clearly define this term.
IV. THE GENERAL CONSTRUCTION LAW
It may be argued that the interpretation of this phrase is
governed by the General Construction Law, which contains "general provisions relating to the construction of statutes and contracts, public and private instruments." 3 6 According to the General Construction Law, the word "year," as used in a statute,
means 365 days. 3 7 Under this statute, eighteen years arguably
means 6570 days. Thus, under the General Construction Law, a
person who is 6571 days old [i.e. eighteen years and one day old]
could be considered "more than eighteen years old." If applicable, the General Construction Law would exclude people on their
eighteenth birthday from the death penalty. The General Construction Law, however, applies to the construction of the language in "every statute unless its general object or the context of
the language construed, or other provision of law indicates a different meaning or application was intended from that required
to be given." 38 As will be shown, both the legislative history and
the legislature's common understanding of the words, "more
than eighteen years old," indicate that the General Construction
39
Law does not control this issue.
Ellingham, 116 A.D.2d at 1034 (stating Court of Appeals rejected common law rule that
"age" occurs on day before birthday); People v. Ennis, 94 A.D.2d 746, 747 (2d Dep't 1983)
(recognizing Stevenson court's ability to determine what constitutes age in state); Rodriguez v. A.F. Myerson, 69 A.D.2d 162, 166 (2d Dep't 1979) (explaining that legislature
clearly wants to enlarge term juvenile delinquent, but recognizing that one cannot reach
"age" in New York until birthday); People v. Alouisa, 466 N.Y.S.2d 1007, 1009 (Suffolk
County Ct. 1983) (negating common law rule for computing age).
35 Smith, 351 P.2d at 1078.
36 See N.Y. GEN. CONSTR. LAW, CONSOLIDATOR'S NOTES, Book 21, p. IX (1997).
37 See N.Y. GEN. CONSTR. LAW § 58 (McKinney 1998) (describing meaning of term
"year" as provided in statutes, contracts, and public or private instruments).
38 See N.Y. GEN. CONSTR. LAW § 110 (McKinney 1998).
39 See In re Bardol, 4 N.Y.S.2d 795, 798 (4th Dep't 1938), affid 278 N.Y. 543 (1938).
The Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of the Appellate Division, refused to apply
the General Construction Law to calculate a person's age; the method of computing age
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V. LEGISLATIVE INTENT

In People ex rel Makins v. Wilkins, 40 the Fourth Department held that the language, "over the age of ten years and less

4
than sixteen years of age," in former Penal Law Section 483-b '
applied only to children who have reached their eleventh birthday and are under sixteen years old. The court reached its decision, not from a semantical analysis of the meaning of "over [x]
years of age" in a statute, but from determining the legislative
intent as revealed by the history underlying the enactment of
this statute. 42 In the words of the court:

It is recognized that the words "over" or "under" when used
in connection with a specified age may be judicially construed with varying results. Similarly, a literal construction
of [this] section... may well produce a rule contrary to that
here reached. But such a literal construction must be rejected if it is evident that a literal construction does not correctly reflect the legislative intent, as indicated by the genand its language read
eral purpose and history of the statute
43
as a whole and not word by word.
Makins is significant, not only for its guidance in gleaning the
legislative intent of the statute, but for its recognition that somewas the common law rule that a person reached their next year of age on the day before
the anniversary of their birthday. Id. As noted above, the Court of Appeals subsequently
refused to follow the common law rule. Id.; see also Stevenson, 23 A.D.2d at 472. The
court held that a person reaches their next year of age on the day of their birthday. Id.
Stevenson, however, does not stand for the proposition that the General Construction
Law is to be used to interpret the meaning of age language contained in any statute. Id.
Specifically, the Court's decision was not based on the General Construction Law, rather,
the determination of age was based on a person's actual birth date, "the common understanding of the..." meaning of the phrase "less than sixteen years of age." Id. See generally Heywood v. Boyland, 140 N.Y.S.2d 769, 770 (Sup. Ct. 1955) (limiting General Construction Law exclusions to not having appreciation for New York City's Charter Section
which excludes holidays).
40 22 A.D.2d 497 (4th Dep't 1965). See generally New York State Dep't of Hygiene v.
State Div. of Human Rights, 103 A.D.2d 546, 551 (2d Dep't 1984), affd 66 N.Y.2d 752 (2d
Dep't 1985) (stating that drafters do not always get exact idea across in statute); Rouse v.
O'Connell, 78 Misc.2d 82 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974) (recognizing that statute construction is
important science); Izzo v. Kirby, 56 Misc.2d 131, 136 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968) (stating that
literal construction should be rejected if it does not meet legislative intent).
41 See FORMER N.Y. PENAL LAW § 483-b (L. 1929 c. 684) (amended L. 1957 c. 482).
42 In fact, the General Construction Law was never mentioned in the Court's decision.
43 Makins, 22 A.D.2d at 500. See Hudson City Savings v. Druzen, 153 A.D.2d 91, 93
(3rd Dep't 1990) (discussing importance of avoiding statute construction that conflicts
with legislative intent); Izzo, 56 Misc.2d at 134 (claiming apparent significance of language is not always controlling); In re Stafford's Estate, 103 N.Y.S.2d 153, 154 (Sur. Ct.
1951) (noting how all courts should make decisions with legislature's intent in mind).
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thing as seemingly simple as interpreting the age requirement of
a statute can be a difficult undertaking. The age language of
Penal Law Section 125.27 will no doubt engender vigorous litigation as to its meaning. This issue will be troubling for courts
since a particular interpretation may have deadly consequences
for persons who are either exactly eighteen years old, or have not
yet reached their nineteenth birthday. For some courts interpreting this statute, the immediate and understandable reaction
will be that the "more than eighteen" language means nineteen
years old. Other courts may reach a contrary result; of those
courts faced with the indictment of a person who, by chance, is
alleged to have committed First Degree Murder on his/her eighteenth birthday, the struggle will be whether the statutory age
language means exactly eighteen years old, eighteen years and
one day old or older, or nineteen years old.
Needless to say, only one statutory interpretation is possible.
Despite the absence of an express statement from either the governor or the legislature as to the meaning of the words "more
than eighteen years old," a conclusive interpretation based upon
a plain reading of this phrase, or a clear rule to follow from other
jurisdictions, the answer to this question can ultimately be found
in the legislative history, dating as far back as 1963, New York
case law and New York statutes using similar language.
Initially, when interpreting a statute, "the primary command
to the judiciary. . . is to ascertain and effectuate the purpose of
the Legislature." 44 "Whenever such intent is apparent from the
entire statute, its legislative history, or the statutes of which it is
'45
made a part, it must be followed in construing the statute.
Ordinarily, if the statutory language is clear and unambiguous,
44 See Abood v. Hospital Ambulance Serv., 30 N.Y.2d 295, 298 (1972); see also Rankin
v. Shankar, 23 N.Y.2d 111, 114 (1968) (explaining legislative intent); Application of
Carns, 43 N.Y.S.2d 497, 504 (Sup. Ct. 1943) (stating that courts will indulge legislative
intent arguments because they are controlling); People v. Formiscio, 39 N.Y.S.2d 149,
151 (N.Y. City Ct. Spec. Sess. 1943) (noting that literalness takes backseat to any legislative intent that is evident).
45 Abood, 30 N.Y.2d at 298. See Wing v. Ryan, 255 A.D. 163, 164 (3rd Dep't 1938),
affd, 278 N.Y. 710 (1938) (stating statutes should not be interpreted by strict adherence
to technically grammatical rules); see also In re Bickerton, 232 N.Y. 1, 1 (1921) (noting
that it is not uncommon to enlarge or restrain meaning of words in order to meet legislative intent); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Padura, 224 N.Y. 397, 399 (1918) (permitting courts to
transpose words in order to reach legislative intent); People v. Cubiotti, 157 N.Y.S.2d
784, 789 (Rochester City Ct. 1956) (recognizing that courts are always justified in departing from literal meaning of words in order to preserve intent of legislature).
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46
then the plain meaning of the statute should be given effect.
Such a literal interpretation is to be avoided, however, where it
47
does not "express the statute's manifest intent and purpose."
With these principles in mind, it is necessary for two reasons, to
go beyond the literal language of Penal Law Section 125.27 and
determine the underlying legislative intent of this statute. First,
an argument can be made that the literal language of "more than
eighteen years old" is vague and ambiguous. The term may
mean either a person exactly eighteen years old, eighteen years
and one day old or older, or nineteen years old. Accordingly, this
ambiguity can only be resolved by determining what the Legislature intended this phrase to mean. Second, even if it is more
logical to conclude that the plain meaning of "more than eighteen
years old" means either eighteen years and one day old or nineteen years old, any one of these interpretations is contrary to the
Legislature's intent that Penal Law Section 125.27 includes persons who have reached their eighteenth birthday.
To begin, the 1963 amendment to New York's death penalty
was specifically patterned after the Model Penal Code. 48 Two
significant features of the Model Penal Code were made part of
the 1963 legislation: The express rejection of capital punishment
for persons under eighteen years of age and a two stage jury proceeding in death penalty cases. (The first stage was designed to
determine a defendant's guilt on the underlying murder, and the
second to determine if the death penalty should be imposed). 4 9

46 See Brooklyn Bridge Park Coalition v. Port Authority, 951 F. Supp. 383, 385
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (outlining how common sense tells that plain meaning of statute must be
considered if result is not outrageous); see also Choate v. City of Buffalo, 57 N.Y.S. 383,
391 (4th Dep't 1899), aff'd, 167 N.Y. 597 (1901) (noting that cases can be decided by
reading plain language of statute); Greenman v. Levitt, 93 Misc.2d 310, 315 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1978) (adopting plain meaning unless construction leaves statute totally negatory).
47 See People v. Schwebel, 255 N.Y.S.2d 760, 763, affid, 16 N.Y.2d 724 (1965) (allowing departure from plain language if legislative intent can be achieved). See generally
Ball v. State of New York, 52 A.D.2d 47, 60 (3rd Dep't 1976), a/Pd, 41 N.Y.2d 617 (1977)
(disallowing claim based on legislative intent simply because statute could have been
worded better); O'Mera v. A&P, 169 Misc.2d 697 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1996) (weighing legislative intent heavily when deciding applicable construction of statute).
48 See 1963 N.Y. Laws c. 994, § 2076 (approving statute which removed mandatory
death penalty for murder and kidnapping, giving jury discretion to impose death penalty); see also 1963 N.Y. Laws c. 565, § 2018 (proposing bill that would impose death penalty in all cases except for felony murder and wanton or depraved types of first degree
murder).
49 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(1)(d) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962); see also
Memorandum of N.Y. Temp. Comm. on Revision of the Penal Law and Crim. Code, 1963
McKinney's Session Laws of N.Y. at 2018.
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When the revised Penal Law went into effect in 1967, the legislature though changing the wording of the age requirement for the
death penalty from "less than eighteen years old" to "more than
eighteen years old" was simply carrying over the 1963 legislation, as had been influenced by the Model Penal Code. Age eligibility for the death penalty remained unchanged at eighteen
years old. In fact, there were substantive changes made to the
death penalty by the time of the Revised Penal Law's 1967 effective date. The purpose of these amendments, however, had absolutely nothing to do with increasing the age for death eligibility. To understand this, some background is necessary.
Prior to 1965, under the Former Penal Law, the death penalty
applied to all forms of Murder in the First Degree. 50 In 1965, the
legislature limited the death penalty under the former Penal
Law solely to premeditated murder, but only where the victim
was a peace officer or the defendant was serving a life sentence. 5 1 A year later, however, the legislature expanded the
death penalty under the Former Penal Law to include both premeditated murders, as well as felony murders. In either situation, the victim had to have been a peace officer or the defendant
52
must have been serving a life sentence.
While legislation refining the scope of the death penalty was
ongoing, the Commission was at work drafting the Revised Penal
Law. Less than one month after the legislature narrowed the
scope of the death penalty under the Former Penal Law, the Revised Penal Law was enacted. In approving this legislation,
Governor Rockefeller acknowledged that further amendments
would undoubtedly be necessary before the September 1, 1967
effective date. 5 3 Such an amendment was indeed required with
respect to the death penalty, for given the timing of the amendment to the Former Penal Law, 5 4 the Commission had no opportunity to incorporate the changes made in that legislation to the
Revised Penal Law's death penalty. 5 5 As a result, the death penalty under the Revised Penal Law essentially mirrored that of
50 See FORMER N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1045 (L. 1963 c. 994).

51 See FORMER N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1045 (L. 1965 c. 321).
52 See FORMER N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1045 (L. 1966 c. 66).
53 See Gov. Rockefeller's Approval Memorandum, 1965 N.Y. Laws at 2120.
54 See FORMER N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1045 (L. 1965 c. 321).

55 See Sixth Interim Report of the State of N.Y. Temp. Comm. on Revision of the Penal Law and Criminal Code, NY Legis. Doc. No. 6 at 4 (1967).
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the 1963 amendment, not the death penalty as had been revised
by the 1965 amendment to the Former Penal Law. 56 Thus, the
purpose of the 1967 amendment to the Revised Penal Law 57 was
to ensure that the death penalty under the new Penal Law reflected "the recent will of the legislature," as was expressed in
the legislative changes of 1965 and 1966 to the death penalty
under the Former Penal Law. 58 Such was the sole reason for the
amendment; increasing the age requirement for the death penalty played absolutely no role in that legislation. As generally
explained by the Commission, the reason for the modification
from "less than eighteen" to "more than eighteen" was simply a
"language change.., designed to accommodate [this] section ...
to the new [Penal Law] pattern." 59 In fact, a comparison of the
death penalty statutes from 1963 to 1967 (set forth in the Appendix) clarifies this explanation. The 1965 version of the Penal
60
Law were almost identical, both in wording and structure, to
6
1
the Former Penal Law. By contrast, the Penal Law sections
drafted in 196762 were a combination of these statutes; in drafting the 1967 amendment, the Commission rearranged the language and expressed certain parts of the prior statutes somewhat differently. Specifically, whereas the Former Penal Law
and the Revised Penal Law of 1965 directed the court to sentence
a defendant to other than death if he/she was "under or less than
eighteen years old," the 1967 Penal Law directed the court to
hold a defendant over for a death penalty hearing if satisfied
that a defendant was "more than eighteen years old." In effect,
the format chosen for the 1967 versions of the Penal Law resulted in the age requirement being expressed by the direct language "more than eighteen years old," rather than by the negative wording, "not less than eighteen years old." In essence, the
56 See Appendix; see also Staff Comments to Proposed NY Penal Law § 130.30 (subsequently renumbered Penal Law § 125.30), 1C-63 GILBERT CRIMINAL CODE AND PENAL
LAW (1969 ed.).

57 See L. 1967 c. 791 (repealed 1974).
58 See Sixth Interim Report of the State of N.Y. Temp. Comm. on Revision of the Penal Law and Criminal Code, N.Y. Legis. Doc. No. 6 at 4 (1967); see also Bill Jacket to L.
1968 c. 949.
59 See Sixth Interim Report of the State of N.Y. Temp. Comm. on Revision of the Penal Law and Criminal Code, N.Y. Legis. Doc. No. 6 at 4 (1967).
60 See FORMER N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 125.30, 125.35 (L. 1965 c. 1030) (repealed 1974).
61 See FORMER N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 1045, 1045-a (L. 1963 c. 994).
62 See FORMER N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 125.30, 125.35 (L. 1967 c. 791) (repealed 1974).
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change in language was intended to be stylistic in nature, not
substantive.
It should also be remembered that the change in language
arose as part of a revision of the law. It is a rule of statutory
construction that, in a revision, the legislature does not intend a
change in the law merely because of a change in statutory language. 6 3 Rather, in the absence of a clear expression of a legislative purpose to effect such change, there is a presumption that
no change is intended. 6 4 Not only is an expression of such intent
absent, but that an age change was even intended is belied by
the commentators to the Revised Penal Law - the Executive Director and Counsel respectively to the Commission - who noted
in 1967:
This section and two other provisions (sections 60.05,
125.35) collectively restate the substance of sections 1045
and 1045-a of the former Penal Law. The latter two statutes, representing important recent legislation, combined to
abolish the death penalty for murder in all but two narrow
situations. They also establish a so-called "two stage" trial
for all actions in which the death penalty may legally be imposed, involving separate jury proceedings to determine
whether the sentence should be death or life imprison65
ment.
Given this explanation, it seems that the legislature fully intended to carry the age eligibility for the death penalty, as it existed under the 1963 and 1965 amendments, into the 1967
amendment. Therefore, the language "more than eighteen years
old" was intended by the Legislature to include persons at least
eighteen years of age. Since that same language was retained in
the 1974 and 1995 amendments, it would continue to have the
6
same meaning. 6
63 See N.Y. GEN. LAWS § 422 (McKinney 1998).
64 Id.
65 See Denzer & McQuillan, McKinney's Practice Commentaries, N.Y. PENAL LAW §
125.30 (1967).
66 See Bill Jacket, 1995 N.Y. Laws § 125.27. It should also be noted that the bill
jacket for the 1995 amendment to Penal Law § 125.27 contains a memorandum from Attorney General Vacco to Governor Pataki stating that the death penalty applies to persons at least eighteen years of age. Id.; see also People ex rel Makins, 22 A.D.2d 497, 497
(4th Dep't 1965). "Communications sent to the Governor relating to a bill passed by the
Legislature and before him for action are not conclusive but they are aids in seeking legislative intent." Id. at 498.
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Finally, the legislature's silence as to the age issue may also be
indicative of its position. In 1948 and 1963, when the legislature
increased the age requirement for death eligibility, that goal was
spelled out expressly in the legislative history. The silence in
1967, 1974, and 1995, therefore, bespeaks an intent to retain the
age requirement as it existed in both 1963 and 1965. Notably, in
1965, a majority of the Commission to the Revised Penal Law
had recommended to the governor and the legislature that the
death penalty should be abolished in New York. 6 7 In fact, several
bills to abolish capital punishment were introduced and ultimately defeated in the legislature. 68 For the legislature to have
increased the age requirement in 1967 from eighteen years of
age to eighteen years and one day old, or even nineteen years of
age without a word from either Governor Rockefeller, the legislature, or the Commission is seemingly unthinkable. Any change
of such magnitude would probably have been reflected either in
the legislative history, the interim reports prepared by the
Commission, or the staff comments prepared in conjunction with
the Revised Penal Law.
VI. NEW YORK CASE LAW
The conclusion that the death penalty applies to persons at
least eighteen years old is also supported by the Court of Appeals
in People v. Davis. 6 9 In Davis, the court struck down the mandatory death penalty of 1974.70 Writing for the majority, Judge
Cooke stated that, "under the recent decisions of the Supreme
Court, the exclusion of an entire category of offenders under
eighteen years of age by New York Penal Law 7 1 from punishment by death is not a mitigating factor since such limitations do
67 See Fourth Interim Report of the State of NY Temp. Comm. on Revision of the Penal Law and Criminal Code, N.Y. Legis. Doc. No. 25 at 68-70 (1965).
68 See New York Legislative Record and Index, 1965, p. 1380; see also Fourth Interim
Report of the State of N.Y. Temp. Comm. on Revision of the Penal Law and Criminal
Code, N.Y. Legis. Doc. No. 25 at 71 (1965).
69 43 N.Y.2d 17 (1977).
70 See id. Actually, Davis only struck down that part of the mandatory death penalty
as it related to persons who intentionally murder police officers and employees of state or
local correctional facilities. Id.; see also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27(1) (a) (i)-(ii) (L. 1974 c.
367); People v. Smith, 63 N.Y.2d 41, 78 (1984). The Court of Appeals struck down the
mandatory death penalty as it related to a person who, while serving a term of life imprisonment, commits intentional murder. Id.
71 N.Y. Penal Law § 125.27(1)(b) (L. 1974 c. 367).
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not afford individualized consideration of the individual." 72
Chief Judge Breitel, writing for the dissent, pointed out that one
ameliorative aspect of Penal Law section 125.27, was that "a
person may not be convicted of first degree murder unless he is
at least 18 years of age." 73 Though disagreeing over the constitutionality of the death penalty, the Court of Appeals unanimously
agreed that the 1974 death penalty statute, which contained the
language "more than eighteen years old," applied to persons
74
eighteen years of age or older.
The language in Davis strongly supports the conclusion that
the words "more than eighteen years old," means persons eighteen years old and older. Indeed, this conclusion is further buttressed by the Court of Appeals decision in Kuczka v. Clark.75
There the court held that the language "more than twenty-nine
years old" in the Civil Service Law included persons who were
exactly twenty-nine years old. 76 The Court of Appeals affirmed
on the basis that "a person who reaches his twenty-ninth birthday has already lived a full twenty-nine years and thereafter he
may be said to be more than twenty-nine years of age."' 7 7 Since

the age language of Penal Law section 125.27 is identical to the
age language used in the Civil Service Law, it appears that the
same analysis employed in Kuczka to interpret that particular
age language may be applied to construe the age language of Penal Law section 125.27. Accordingly, using Kuczka as an interpretive aid, the language "more than eighteen years old" in Penal
Law section 125.27 means persons who have reached their eighteenth birthday.78

Two lower courts directly faced with this issue have concluded
that the age requirement in Penal Law Section 125.2779 applies
to persons who are eighteen years old.8 0 In Bell, the court, interpreting Penal Law Section 125.27,81 stated that the defendant,
72
73
74
75
76
77

Davis, 43 N.Y.2d at 17.
Id. at 42

Id.
86 A.D.2d 980 (4th Dep't), affd, 58 N.Y.2d 738 (1982).
See id.
Id. at 981.

78 Id.

79 N.Y. Penal Law Law § 125.27 (McKinney 1998).

80 See People v. Morris Bell, N.Y.L.J., March 27, 1997, at 31-32; see also People v.
Carr, 159 Misc.2d 1093, -095 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994).
81 N.Y. Penal Law Law § 125.27 (McKinney 1998).
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who was eighteen years and six months old at the time of the
homicide, was "more than eighteen years old" within the meaning of the statute. 8 2 Interestingly, it was suggested that a different conclusion might have been reached in Bell had the homicide
occurred on the defendant's eighteenth birthday by the court's
statement: "[G]iven the fact that the defendant had attained his
eighteenth birthday prior to the date of the crime, he was more
83
than eighteen years old as required by the statute."
The court in Carr, however, interpreting the 1974 version of
Penal Law Section 125.27 held that the language, "more than
eighteen years old," applies to persons who have reached their
eighteenth birthday. 8 4 In Carr, the defendant argued that the
legislature's decision to use the obviously different phrase,
"eighteen years old or more," in the statutes defining various sex
offenses, 8 5 was evidence that a different meaning was intended
for Penal Law section 125.27,86 namely, that persons eighteen
years of age and younger were not criminally responsible for
Murder in the First Degree. 8 7 The court in Carr, however,
pointed out that Penal Law section 130.55 uses the term "more
than fourteen years old," which, according to the practice commentaries, includes people who are fourteen years old. 8 8 If "more
than fourteen years old" includes persons at least fourteen years
of age for Penal Law Section 130.55, then it is logical to assume
that the same construction was intended for the age language of
Penal Law Section 125.27.89

82 See Bell, N.Y.L.J., March 27, 1997 at 32.
83 Id. The Court in Bell cited Carr with approval. Id. To interpret the meaning of
"more than eighteen years old," the Bell court used an analysis similar to the one used in
Kuczka. Id.
84 See Carr, 159 Misc.2d at 1095.
85 Id. (emphasis added).
86 N.Y. Penal Law Law § 125.27 (L. 1974 c. 794).
87 See Carr, 159 Misc.2d 1093 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994).
88 See Donnino, Practice Commentary, McKINNEY'S CONSOLIDATED LAWS OF NY,

PENAL LAW, Book 39, at 571 (1997) (noting support for conclusion reached in practice
commentary to Penal Law section 130.55 came from original Staff Comments to Law Revision Committee); STAFF COMMENTS OF THE COMMISSION OF THE REVISION OF THE PENAL
LAW, MCKINNEYS SPEC. PAMPH., 276 (1965); see also Fourth Interim Report of the State

of N.Y. Temp. Comm. on Revision of the Penal Law and Criminal Code, N.Y. Legis. Doc.
No. 25 at 30- 31 (1965) (stating under Penal Law § 130.55, "a person cannot commit 'sexual abuse' upon an acquiescent 'victim' of the age of fourteen, fifteen, or sixteen unless he
(the actor) is at least five years older than such 'victim").
89 See Carr, 159 Misc.2d at 1095.
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VII. NEW YORK STATUTES CONTAINING SIMILAR LANGUAGE

That the language, "more than eighteen years old," in Penal
Law Section 125.27 means persons exactly eighteen years of age
is also supported by rules of statutory construction as applied to
related statutes defining age requirements. The basic rule states
that where a word or phrase is used in many parts of a statute,
it is presumed to be used in the same manner throughout the
statute. 90
This rule is modified by the additional rule that "[a] statute or
legislative act is to be read and construed as a whole, and all
parts of an act are to be read together to determine the legislative intent."9 1 In other words, even though the Penal Law is divided into articles, "all sections... must be read together to determine its fair meaning."9 2 Accordingly, the legislature's
intended meaning for the term "more than fourteen years old" in
Penal Law Section 130.55 is evidence that the same construction
was intended for Penal Law Section 125.27. 9 3 This seems especially true since the Commission drafted both of these sections of
the Penal Law.
Penal Law Sections 125.27 and 130.55, however, are not isolated uses of the words "more than [x] years old" by the Legislature. For example, New York Criminal Procedure Law Section
60.20(2) states:
Every witness more than twelve years old may testify only
under oath unless the court is satisfied that such witness
cannot, as a result of mental disease or defect, understand
the nature of an oath. A child less than twelve years old may
not testify under oath unless the court is satisfied that he
understands the nature of an oath. If the court is not so
satisfied, such child or such witness over twelve years old
who cannot, as a result of mental disease or defect, understand the nature of an oath may nevertheless be permitted
to give unsworn evidence if the court is satisfied that the
90 See N.Y. CONSTR. & INTERP. LAW § 236 (McKinney 1998). "In the absence of anything in the statute indicating an intention to the contrary, where the same word or
phrase is used in different parts of a statute, it will be presumed to be used in the same
sense throughout, and the same meaning will be attached to similar expressions in the
same or related statute." Id.
91 N.Y. Constr. & Interp. Law § 97 (McKinney 1998).
92 N.Y. Constr. & Interp. Law § 130 (McKinney 1998).
93 N.Y. Penal Law § 125.27 (L. 1974 c. 367).
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intelligence and capacity to juswitness possesses sufficient
94
tify the receipt thereof.
The "more than twelve years old" language is defined by the
ensuing words "less than twelve years old," which, by excluding
twelve year olds, necessarily includes twelve year olds in the
"more than" category. 9 5 In other words, the "less than" language
of New York Criminal Procedure Law Section 60.20(2) more
clearly defines what the words "more than twelve years old" signify, namely persons at least twelve years old. Statutes which
relate to the same subject matter "are to be construed together
as though forming part of the same statute."9 6 Thus, since the
Penal Law and Criminal Procedure Law both relate to the criminal branch of the law, they also relate to the same subject matter. 9 7 Guided by this rule of statutory construction and McKinney's Statutes, 98 the meaning given by the Legislature to the
phrase "more than twelve years old" in the Criminal Procedure
Law, 99 is evidence that the same meaning was intended for the
Penal Law. 1 00
Still another example of the Legislature's use of the words,

94 N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 60.20(2) (McKinney 1998) (emphasis added). This section
was amended in 1975 to allow people 12 years of age or older, who lacked the mental capacity to testify under oath, to testify if the court determined that they possessed sufficient intelligence to give unsworn testimony. Id.; See FORMER CODE OF CRIM. PROC. §
392. Under the Code of Criminal Procedure section 392 and New York Criminal Procedure Law section 60.20 (L. 1970 c. 996), unsworn testimony could only be given by persons who were under the age of twelve. Id.
95 Any doubt as to this meaning is dispelled by the history underlying the statute.
See FORMER CODE OF CRIM. PROC. § 392. The predecessor to New York Criminal Procedure Law section 60.20 was the Code of Criminal Procedure Law section 392, which contained the language "under the age of twelve years," but not the phrase, "more than
twelve years old," as does New York Criminal Procedure Law section 60.20. Id.; see also
People v. Klein, 266 N.Y. 188, 188 (1935). The code created a rebuttable presumption
that a child under the age of twelve was incompetent to be sworn. Id.; PRINCE &
RICHARDSON ON EVIDENCE, § 6-106, 315 (Farrell 11th ed.). Cases decided under the Code
held that a person at least twelve years old was presumed competent to be sworn and
testify under oath. Id. See, e.g., People v. Hemphill, 286 A.D. 1152 (4th Dep't 1955); 01shansky v. Presnsky, 185 A.D. 469 (2d Dep't 1918).
96 See N.Y. CONSTR. & INTERP. LAW § 221(b) (McKinney 1998) (according to general
rules of construction, statutes which are in pari materiaare to be construed together).
97 See id. N.Y. CONSTR. & INTERP. LAW § 221(c) (McKinney 1998).
98 See id. N.Y. CONSTR. & INTERP. LAW § 236 (McKinney 1998) (explaining that in
absence of indication to contrary, same words used in different parts of statute will be
construed similarly).
99 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.20 (McKinney 1998).
100 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27; see also N.Y. CONSTR. & INTERP. LAW § 222
(McKinney 1998) (statutes are to be construed with reference to earlier and subsequent
statutes relating to same subject matter).
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"more than [x] years," can be found in the Former Penal Law, 10 1
dealing with the sentencing of minors. That section read in pertinent part:
A child of more than seven years and less than sixteen years
of age, who shall commit any act or omission which, if committed by an adult, would be a crime, shall not be deemed
guilty of a crime, but of juvenile delinquency only, but any
other person concerned therein, whether as a principal or
accessory, who otherwise would be punishable as a principal
or accessory shall be punishable as a principal or accessory
in the same manner as if such child were over sixteen years
of age at the time the crime was committed ...102
It is clear that the legislature intended that a child exactly
seven years old was "more than seven years old" within the
meaning of this statute, and thus could be adjudicated a juvenile
delinquent. Under the Former Penal Law, 10 3 children under
seven years of age - meaning at least six years old or younger were deemed incapable of committing crimes and, thus, were not
responsible for their conduct. 1 04 Pursuant to another section of
the Former Penal Law,1 0 5 however, "a child of the age of seven
years and under the age of twelve years, was presumed to be in1 06 Accapable of crime, but the presumption [was rebuttable]."'
101 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 2186 (L. 1948 c. 488).
102 Id.

103 See FORMER N.Y. PENAL LAW § 816 (L. 1909 c. 88).
104 See SIR WILLIAM BLACKsTONE, IV COMMENTARIES ON LAW OF ENGLAND 23-24
(discussing that child at least seven years old could not be guilty of felony); see also
Sherri Jackson, Too Young to Die - Juveniles and the Death Penalty - A Better Alternative to Killings and Children: Youth Empowerment, 22 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CV.
CONFINEMENT 391, 401 (1996) (analyzing Framer's contention that forms of juvenile
punishment were cruel and unusual); Marcia Johnson, Juveniles and the Juvenile Justice
System, 96 WHI'rIER L. REV. 713, 749-51 (1996) (discussing history of juvenile punishment and current eighth amendment concern in United States); Vedp Nomda, The
United States Reservation to the Ban on the Death Penalty for Juvenile Offenders: An Appraisal Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 42 DEPAUL L.
REv. 1311, 1312 (1993) (placing current juvenile justice laws in historical framework).
105 See FORMER N.Y. PENAL LAW § 817 (L. 1909 c. 88).
106 See Fain. Ct. Act § 301.2(8)(vi) (McKinney 1998) (defining Juvenile Delinquent as
"person over seven and less than sixteen"; term "over seven... years of age" has been
interpreted as applying to children who are at least seven years old); see also Matter of
Robert G., 121 Misc.2d 680, 681 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1983) (stating that common-law defense
of infancy was not available to minors aged seven years five months old and nine years);
Matter of Robert M., 110 Misc.2d 113, 114 (N.Y. Faro. Ct. 1983) (holding that presumption of infancy is inapplicable in delinquent cases and that defendant has requisite intent); Matter of Andrew M., 91 Misc.2d 813, 816 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1977) (holding that although defendant met statutory requirement of being over seven years and under sixteen
years he did not have requisite mens rea).
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cordingly, since the Former Penal Law expressly excluded children under the age of seven as being capable of committing
crimes, but expressly included children at least seven years and
older as potentially capable of committing crimes, it necessarily
follows that the legislature's use of the term "more than
seven" 1 0 7 meant children at least seven years of age. If this were
an incorrect interpretation, then there would be a gap for seven
year olds, who, although potentially capable of committing
crimes, could not be dealt with legally. 108
With respect to the words "over sixteen years of age," it is evident that this language meant persons at least sixteen years old.
The statute stipulated that persons sixteen years of age or older,
who committed a crime with a child under sixteen years old,
were still criminally responsible for such conduct, it being no excuse that the child lacked the capacity to commit such crime. 10 9
The statute, in essence, created the fiction that the minor who
committed acts constituting a crime was to be thought of as if
he/she had the legal capacity to do so; in other words, the minor
was considered to be at least sixteen years old. This intent was
expressed by the words "over sixteen years of age," but it is clear
that the legislature intended it to mean persons at least sixteen
years old.
The legislature's intention that the phrases "more than seven
years old" and "over sixteen years old," in the Former Penal
Law 1 1 0 include the particular age mentioned, is evidence that
the same construction was meant for the current version of Penal Law section 125.27.111 As discussed above, "[a] statute is to
be construed with reference to earlier and subsequent statutes
11 2
relating to the same subject matter."
The similar meaning of the age language in the statutory examples outlined above reflect a consistent pattern of statutory
drafting. It reveals that the legislature has, for some time, un107 See FORMER N.Y. PENAL LAW § 2186 (L. 1949 c. 388) (stating "more than seven"
language).
108 See N.Y. CONSTR. & INTERP. LAW § 144 (McKinney 1998) (indicating statutes will
not be construed as to render them ineffective).
109 See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 20.05 (1) (McKinney 1998) (upholding criminal
liability for those "over 16" committing crime with child "under 16").
110 See FORMER N.Y. PENAL LAW § 2186 (L. 1949 c. 388).
III See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27 (McKinney 1998).
112 NY. Constr. & Interp. Law §§ 222, 236 (McKinney 1998).
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derstood that age requirements expressed in "more than [x]
years of age" or "over [x] years of age" include the particular age
mentioned. Since the Penal Law section 125.27113 contains age
language identical to these statutes, it too should be interpreted
consistent with what the legislature has commonly understood
the words "more than [x] years of age" to mean.
Finally, another rule of statutory construction holds that in
amending a statute, the legislature is presumed to know the
holdings of courts interpreting the statute and that absent evidence to the contrary, the legislature will be deemed to have accepted that interpretation.11 4 Thus, when the legislature
amended sections of the Penal Law in 1995115 and carried over
the "more than language" into that statute, it did so with presumptive knowledge of the decisions in Davis and Carr and,
thus, adopted those interpretations. In addition to Davis and
Carr, there is also the court of appeals decision in Kuczka, interpreting an age requirement with identical language. Given Kuczka, 116 the legislature was on notice that age requirements, as
interpreted by the judiciary, drafted in "more than [x] years"
language, include the particular age mentioned. Accordingly,
when the legislature amended the Penal Law in 1995 and kept
the very same language for the age requirement, it adopted the
interpretation given to this language by the court in Kuczka.
CONCLUSION

It is not certain why somewhat ambiguous words were chosen
for the death penalty's age requirement. Regardless of why the
words "more than eighteen years old" were used to define age
eligibility for the death penalty, there is overwhelming support
for the conclusion that New York's death penalty statute applies
to persons who had reached their eighteenth birthday at the
time of the commission of the homicide.
113 See N.Y. Penal Law § 125.27 (McKinney 1998) (describing "more than" language
in statute).
114 See People ex rel. Malkins v. Wilkins, 22 A.D.2d 497, 499 (4th Dep't 1965); see
also N.Y. Constr. & Interp. Law § 193 (McKinney 1998) (explaining legislature's presumed acceptance of court's interpretations).
115 See N.Y. Penal Law § 125.27 (McKinney 1998).
116 See Kuzca v. Clark, 58 N.Y.2d 738, 738 (1982) (supporting presumption of judicial
notice on part of legislature).
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APPENDIX

I. Former Penal Law § 1045117 stated:

1. Murder in the first degree is punishable by life imprisonment unless the death sentence is imposed as provided by
§ 1045-a.
2. When the court and the district attorney consent, a person indicted for murder in the first degree may plead guilty
to murder in the first degree with a sentence of life imprisonment, in which case the court shouid sentence him accordingly.
3. When a defendant has been found guilty after trial of
murder in the first degree, the court shall discharge the jury
and sentence the defendant to life imprisonment if it is satisfied that defendant was under eighteen years of age at the
time of the commission of the crime, or that the sentence is
not warranted because of substantial mitigating circumstances.
II. FormerPenal Law § 1045118 stated:

1. Murder in the first degree is punishable by life imprisonment unless the death sentence is imposed as provided by
section ten hundred forty-five-a.
2. When the court and the district attorney consent, a person indicted for murder in the first degree may plead guilty
to murder in the first degree with a sentence of life imprisonment, in which case the court shall sentence him accordingly.
3. When a defendant has been found guilty after trial of
murder in the first degree, the court shall discharge the jury
and shall except as provided in subdivision four of this sec117
118

FORMER N.Y. PENAL LAw § 1045 (L. 1963 c. 994).
FORMER N.Y. PENAL LAW§ 1045 (L. 1965 c. 321).
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tion, discharge the jury and shall sentence the defendant to
life imprisonment.
4. When the conviction was for murder in the first degree as
defined in subdivision one of section ten hundred forty-four
the court shall conduct a proceeding pursuant to ten hundred forty-five-a to determine whether the defendant should
be sentenced to life imprisonment, or to death if it is satisfied that either (a) the victim was a peace officer who was
killed in the course of performing his official duties, or (b) at
the time of the commission of the crime the defendant was
confined in a state prison or was otherwise in custody upon a
sentence for the term of his natural life or upon a sentence
commuted to one of natural life, or upon a sentence for an
indeterminate term the minimum of which was at least fifteen years and the maximum of which was natural life, or
having escaped from such confinement or custody the defendant was in immediate flight therefrom. Provided that the
court shall discharge the jury and shall sentence defendant
to life imprisonment if it is satisfied that the defendant was
under eighteen years of age at the commission of the crime,
or that the sentence of death is unwarranted because of substantial mitigating circumstances. 1 19
III. Former Penal Law § 1045-a12 0 stated
1. When a defendant has been found guilty after trial of
murder in the first degree, and such verdict has been recorded upon the minutes, it shall not thereafter be subject to
jury reconsideration.
2. Unless the court sentences the defendant to life imprisonment as provided in subdivision two or three of section ten
hundred forty-five, it shall, as promptly as practical, conduct
a proceeding to determine whether defendant should be sentenced to life imprisonment or death. Such proceeding shall
be conducted before the court sitting with the jury that
119 See L. 1966 c. 66. In 1966, subsection four was amended by substituting the
words "committed from a deliberate and premeditated design to effect the death of the
person killed, or of another, or committed without a design to effect death, by a person
engaged in the commission of, or in an attempt to commit a felony, either upon person
killed or otherwise," for the words "as defined in subdivision one of section ten hundred
forty-four."
120 FORMER N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1045 (L. 1963 c. 994).
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found defendant guilty unless the court for good cause discharges that jury and impanels a new jury for that purpose.
3. In such proceeding, evidence may be presented by either
party on any matter relevant to sentence including, but not
limited to, the nature and circumstances of the crime, defendant's background and history and any aggravating or
mitigating circumstances. Any relevant evidence, not legally
privileged, shall be received regardless of its admissibility
under the exclusionary rules of evidence.
4. The court shall charge the jury on any matters appropriate in the circumstances, including the law relating to the
possible release on parole of a person sentenced to life imprisonment.
5. The jury shall then retire to consider the penalty to be
imposed. If the jury report unanimous agreement on the
imposition of the penalty of death, the court shall discharge
the jury and shall impose the penalty of death. If the jury
report unanimous agreement on the imposition of penalty of
life imprisonment, the court shall discharge the jury and
shall impose the sentence of life imprisonment. If, after the
lapse of such time as the court deems reasonable, the jury
report themselves unable to agree, the court shall discharge
the jury and shall, in its discretion, either impanel a new
jury to determine the sentence or impose the sentence of life
imprisonment.
6. On an appeal by the defendant where the judgement is of
death, the court of appeals, if it finds substantial error only
in sentencing proceeding, may set aside the sentence of
death and remand the case to the trial court, in which event
the trial court shall impose the sentence of life imprisonment. 12 1

121 See L. 1965 c. 321. In 1965, subdivision two was amended as follows:
Unless the court sentences the defendant to life imprisonment as provided in subdivision two, three, or four of section ten hundred forty-five, it shall as promptly as
practical, conduct a proceeding to determine whether defendant should be sentenced
to life imprisonment or to death. Such proceeding shall be conducted before the
court sitting with the jury that found the defendant guilty unless the court for good
cause discharges that jury and impanels a new jury for that purpose.
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IV. FormerRevised PenalLaw § 125.30122 stated:
1. Murder is punishable as a class A felony unless the death
sentence is imposed as provided by § 125.35.
2. When the court and district attorney consent, a person
indicted for murder may plead guilty thereto, in which case
the court shall sentence him as for a class A felony.
3. When a defendant has been found guilty after trial of
murder, the court shall discharge the jury and shall sentence the defendant as for a class A felony if it is satisfied
that he was less than eighteen years old at the time of the
commission of the crime, or that the sentence of death is not
warranted because of substantial mitigating circumstances.
V. FormerRevised Penal Law § 125.35123 stated:
1. When a defendant has been found guilty after trial of
murder, and such verdict has been recorded upon the minutes, it shall not thereafter be subject to jury reconsideration.
2. Unless the court sentences the defendant as for a class A
felony as provided in subdivision two or three § 125.30, it
shall, as promptly as practical, conduct a proceeding to determine whether defendant should be sentenced as for a
class A felony or to death. Such proceeding shall be conducted before the court sitting with the jury that found defendant guilty unless the court for good cause discharges
that jury and impanels a new jury for that purpose.
3. In such proceeding, evidence may be presented by either
party on any matter relevant to sentence including, but not
limited to, the nature and circumstances of the crime, defendant's background and history and any aggravating or
mitigating circumstances. Any relevant evidence, not legally
privileged, shall be received regardless of its admissibility
under the exclusionary rules of evidence.
122
123

FORMER N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.30 (L. 1965 c. 1030).
FORMER N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.35 (L. 1965 c. 1030).
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4. The court shall charge the jury on any matters appropriate in the circumstances, including the law relating to the
maximum and possible minimum terms of imprisonment
and to the possible release on parole of a person sentenced
as for a class A felony.
5. The jury shall then retire to consider the penalty to be
imposed. If the jury report unanimous agreement on the
imposition of the penalty of death, the court shall discharge
the jury and shall impose the penalty of death. If the jury
report unanimous agreement on the imposition of the class
A felony sentence, the court shall discharge the jury and impose such sentence. If, after the lapse of such time as the
court deems reasonable, the jury report themselves unable
to agree, the court shall discharge the jury and shall, in its
discretion, either impanel a new jury to determine the sentence or impose the sentence for a class A felony.
6. On an appeal by the defendant where the judgment is of
death, the court of appeals, if it finds substantial error only
in the sentencing proceeding, may set aside the sentence of
death and remand the case to the trial court, in which event
the trial court shall impose the sentence for class A felony.
VI. FormerRevised Penal Law § 125.30124 stated:
1. When a defendant has been convicted by a jury verdict of
murder as defined in subdivision one or three of § 125.25,125
the court shall, as promptly as practical, conduct a further
proceeding, pursuant to § 125.35 to determine whether defendant shall be sentenced to death in lieu of being sentenced to the term of imprisonment for a class A felony prescribed in section 70, if it is satisfied that:
(a) Either:

124 FORMER N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.30 (L. 1967 c. 791).

125 Due to a drafting error in 1967, which inadvertently made the death penalty applicable to depraved mind murder instead of felony murder, FORMER REVISED PENAL LAw
section 125.30(1) was amended to delete the reference to PENAL LAW section 125.25(2)
and to include the reference to PENAL LAW section 125.25(3). See Law of 1968, c. 949; see
also Bill jacket to Law of 1968 c. 949, S4412, Memorandum by Peter McQuillan, Counsel
to the Temporary Revision of the Penal Law, to John Sheehy, Counsel to Governor
Rockefeller.
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(i) the victim of the crime was a peace officer who was
killed in the course of performing his official duties, or
(ii) at the time of the commission of the crime the defendant was confined in a state prison or was otherwise in
custody upon a sentence for the term of his natural life,
or upon a sentence for an indeterminate term the minimum of which was at least fifteen years and the maximum of which was natural life, or having escaped from
such confinement or custody the defendant was in immediate flight therefrom; and

(b) The defendant was more than eighteen years old at the
time of the commission of the crime; and
(c) There are no substantial mitigating circumstances
which render sentence of death unwarranted.
2. If the court conducts such a further proceeding with respect to sentence, the jury verdict of murder recorded upon
the minutes shall not be subject to jury reconsideration
therein.
VII. FormerRevised Penal Law § 125. 35126 stated.
1. Any further proceeding authorized by § 125.30 with respect to sentence for murder shall be conducted in the manner provided in this section.
2. Such proceeding shall be conducted before the court sitting with the jury that found defendant guilty unless the
court for good cause discharges that jury and impanels a
new jury for that purpose.
3. In such proceeding, evidence may be presented by either
party on any matter relevant to sentence including, but not
limited to, the nature and circumstances of the crime, defendant's background and history and any aggravating or
mitigating circumstances. Any relevant evidence, not legally
privileged, shall be received regardless of its admissibility
126

FORMER N.Y. PENALLAW § 125.35 (L. 1967 c. 791) (repealed 1974).
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under the exclusionary rules of evidence.
4. The court shall charge the jury on any matters appropriate in the circumstances, including the law relating to the
maximum and possible minimum terms of imprisonment
and to possible release on parole of a person sentenced as for
a class A felony.
5. The jury shall the retire to consider the penalty to be imposed. If the jury report unanimous agreement on the imposition of the penalty of death, the court shall discharge the
jury and shall impose the penalty of death. If the jury report
unanimous agreement on the imposition of sentence of imprisonment, the court shall discharge the jury and impose
such sentence. If, after the lapse of such time as the court
deems reasonable, the jury report themselves unable to
agree, the court shall discharge the jury and shall, in its discretion, either impanel a new jury to determine the sentence
or impose the sentence of imprisonment.
6. On an appeal by the defendant where the judgment is of
death, the court of appeals, if it finds substantial error only
in the sentencing proceeding, may set aside the sentence of
death and remand the case to the trial court, in which event
the trial court shall impose the sentence of imprisonment.

